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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF SURVEY
LTHOUGH this Article includes developments in the bank-
ruptcy courts, it is this author's purpose to limit the cases sur-
veyed to those involving state law (e.g., homesteads,
exemptions) or other developments regarding enforcement of the debtor-
creditor relationship. Cases that are limited to an "inside baseball" appli-
cation of the Bankruptcy Code and related developments are typically
avoided. This Article is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of bank-
ruptcy developments but rather an update regarding cases of interest to
the Texas-based debtor-creditor practitioner.'
II. BANKRUPTCY
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
No discussion of bankruptcy developments would be complete without
at least a mention of the wild ride taken by various bankruptcy legislation
in the 105th Congress. Most notable were the bills that passed but not
enacted into law. Specifically, both the House and the Senate passed
their own version of so-called bankruptcy reform legislation, which in-
cluded means testing, homestead limits, and other fundamental changes.
Those bills, however, never made it through conference; thus no reform
legislation was enacted.
The reader should be cautioned that by the time this Survey is pub-
lished, it is reasonable to speculate that bankruptcy legislation will again
be winding its way through Congress. For example, Chapter 12, which
lapsed in late 1998, was extended, but only through and including April 1,
1999.2 Accordingly, one could conclude that Congress anticipates major
bankruptcy legislation by that time.
Some bankruptcy legislation, however, did pass. Perhaps most notable
was the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act,3
which provided some protection for charitable and religious contribu-
tions. This protection comes by way of limited exceptions to a trustee's
avoidance powers, allowing for limited post-confirmation charitable con-
tributions in Chapter Thirteen, and exclusion of qualifying charitable con-
1. Judge Lief Clark provides an extensive, thorough analysis of bankruptcy develop-
ments in the Fifth Circuit in the Fifth Circuit Symposium published annually by Texas Tech
Law Review. See Leif M. Clark, Bankruptcy, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (1998); Leif M.
Clark, Bankruptcy, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299 (1997). For other, broader surveys that
focus exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, see J. Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent
Developments, University of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy Conference (1998); G. Pron-
ske, Recent Developments, State Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course(1998); T. Cornish, Recent Cases That May Affect Your Practice, Texas Tech Farm, Ranch
& Agribusiness Bankruptcy Course (1998).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (Div. C, Tit. 1, § 149). However, there is
a House Bill pending which would re-extend Chapter 12 through Oct. 1, 1999. See H.R.
706, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
3. Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998).
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tributions in making a substantial abuse determination. 4 Other bills
included amendments to the student loan nondischargeability provisions
and extension of Chapter 12 through April 1, 1999.5 Additionally, the
1998 omnibus spending bill also provided certain limited relief for agri-
cultural borrowers. 6
B. PENDING IN SUPREME COURT
As this Survey went to press, the new value exception to the "Absolute
Priority Rule" found in the "cram down" provisions of Chapter 11 was at
stake. Oral argument in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n
v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership7 was held November 2, 1998. An
opinion is expected before the end of the Supreme Court term, which
could come prior to publication of this Survey.
C. HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS
1. Rural/Urban Homesteads
The Fifth Circuit addressed urban and rural homestead exemptions in
In re Crowell.8 The debtor sought to invalidate a creditor's lien on a
forty-two acre tract of land on which the debtor claimed a rural home-
stead. Even though the property had at some time been rural in nature,
the property had been within the city limits of Keller, Texas since 1979.
City sewer and water services were available to the property, and the city
provided police and fire protection. Additionally, numerous platted resi-
dential subdivisions surrounded or were adjacent to the subject property.
Based upon the factors previously articulated in U.S. v. Blakeman,9 the
Fifth Circuit determined that the homestead was urban in nature. Ac-
cordingly, the homestead claim would be limited to one acre. The Fifth
Circuit additionally affirmed the bankruptcy court's requirement that the
debtor designate the one acre portion of the property that he would claim
as his urban homestead. 10
4. As amended, section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code now defines a qualified charita-
ble contribution to be a payment that does not exceed 15% of the gross annual income of
the debtor for the year in which the contribution is made. In the avoidance context, contri-
butions may also qualify if they are consistent with the debtor's past practices in making
charitable contributions. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), (4) & (b) (1998).
5. Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
6. See id. (Div. A., Tit. VIII, §§ 801-04).
7. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub
nom. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 118 S.
Ct. 1674 (1998) (No. 97-1418).
8. Crowell v. Theodore Bender (In re Crowell), 138 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 1998).
9. 997 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1992). Those factors include:
(1) the location of the land with respect to the limits of the municipality;
(2) the situs of the lot in questions;
(3) the existence of municipal utilities and services;
(4) the use of the lot and adjacent property;
(5) the presence of platted streets, blocks, and the like.
Id. at 1091 n.14 (quoting In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 511-12 n.18 (5th Cir. 1992)).




In In re Swift,'" the Fifth Circuit, recognizing the typically exempt na-
ture of a Keogh plan and an IRA, also held that a cause of action for
malpractice in causing the loss of the exempt nature of those plans is itself
exempt. The Fifth Circuit, noting the liberal construction given home-
stead exemptions, reasoned that numerous Texas cases had extended ex-
emption claims to the proceeds of exempt property.
One common theme runs through all of these decisions. The pro-
ceeds, insurance, causes of action, etc., are a substitute for the ex-
empt property that is lost. To be effective, the substitute must be
treated as if it were the lost item. Otherwise, the protection provided
by the exemption would be meaningless, and creditors could attack
the unfortunate debtor more effectively than they could the average
debtor who is less in need of the protection.12
This author does not read the Fifth Circuit to say that all proceeds of
homestead property are forever exempt, but rather an example would be
found in In re Osborne,13 in which an Oklahoma bankruptcy court held
exempt the proceeds paid upon the forced disposition of a homestead in
addition to a cause of action filed to recover damages on the lost
homestead. 14
3. Tools of the Trade-Lien Avoidance
In In re Duvall,15 Judge Ronald King provides the most thorough anal-
ysis of the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code since the 1994 amendments. In 1994, Congress amended section
522(f) to limit lien avoidance against tools of the trade to the extent the
value of those tools exceeds $5,000.16 In Duvall the court acknowledged
that despite the 1994 amendments, a debtor could still avoid a perfected,
but non-purchase money, non-possessory security interest in tools of the
trade.' 7 The FSA claimed a pre-petition lien exceeding $167,000 against
property worth approximately $55,000, representing the value of the
debtor's claimed exemption. The court concluded that the FSA's secured
claim equaled $55,000, less the debtor's lien avoidance of $5,000, for a net
11. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Swift (In re Swift), 129 F.3d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1997).
12. Id. at 801 (footnotes omitted). The court cited section 31.002 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, which provides certain protection to the proceeds of exempt
property: "A court may not enter or enforce an order under this section that requires the
turnover of the proceeds of, or the disbursement of, property exempt under any statute,
including [slection 42.0021, Property Code." TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 31.002(f)
(Vernon 1997).
13. 176 B.R. 217, 220 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
14. The Swift opinion also includes a thorough analysis of the accrual of a cause of
action for negligence in causing the defect in the debtor's Keogh and IRA plans. See Swift,
129 F.3d at 795-801.
15. 218 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).
17. See Duvall, 218 B.R. at 1010-12.
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lien of slightly over $50,000.18
4. Insurance Code Exemptions
In In re Bailey,19 Judge Sharp of the Eastern District reiterated that
court's earlier holdings regarding the conflict between the Insurance
Code exemptions20 and those found in the Texas Property Code.21 That
court had previously held that to the extent there is a conflict between the
unlimited exemption in the Insurance Code and the limited personal
property exemptions in the Property Code, the legislative intent was that
the Insurance Code would prevail. 22 As noted in earlier surveys, this stat-
utory conflict has been the subject of numerous other Texas Bankruptcy
Court opinions.23
D. DISCHARGEABILITY
1. Willful and Malicious Injuries
The United States Supreme Court addressed the poorly worded statute
that is the exception to dischargeability for "willful and malicious in-
jury. '24 In Kawaauhau v. Geiger25 the Supreme Court held that a debt
arising from a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or
reckless conduct did not fall within the willful and malicious injury excep-
tion to discharge. The Court, noting that the word "willful" modifies the
word "injury," reasoned that nondischargeability "takes a deliberate or
intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to
injury."'26 The Court also noted that 523(a)(6), as written, incorporates
the concept of an intentional tort as opposed to a negligent or reckless
tort, intentional torts being those that require that the actor intended
"the consequences of an act" as opposed to intending the act itself.27 This
would appear consistent with the Fifth Circuit's similarly narrow ap-
18. See id. at 1023-24. Again, the court provides a thorough analysis of the history of
lien avoidance in light of Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991), and its progeny and the
concept of an allowed, secured claim under Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
19. 217 B.R. 523 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997).
20. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1997). This provision provides
essentially an unlimited exemption for certain insurance interests and insurance proceeds.
21. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (limiting the total ex-
emption on certain personal property to $60,000 for a married couple or family).
22. See In re Atkins, 217 B.R. 522,523 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997). See also In re Young,
166 B.R. 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
23. Compare In re Borchers, 192 B.R. 698 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) with In re Scott,
193 B.R. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996). See generally Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Credi-
tors' Rights, 50 SMU L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1997).
24. Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge in bankruptcy
"[D]oes not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for willful and malicious
injury . . . to another." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1997).
25. 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
26. Id. at 977. The Court continued: "Had Congress meant to exempt debts arising
from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead 'willful acts that
cause injury.' Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., 'reckless'




proach in In re Delaney,28 in which the court held that injuries resulting
from an accidental discharge of a shotgun being wielded by the debtor in
a threatening manner gave rise to a dischargeable claim. In that case, the
Fifth Circuit also struggled with the poor wording of the same statute.29
Shortly after the narrow approach taken in Geiger, the Supreme Court
reiterated the traditionally broader approach applied to section
523(a)(2)(A) claims based on actual fraud.3a In Cohen v. De La Cruz,31
the Court held that a "debt" for money, property, etc., obtained by fraud
includes statutory or exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, or other ele-
ments of recovery under state law and is therefore non-dischargeable
along with the principal amount of the underlying claim.32
During the survey period, however, the Fifth Circuit addressed willful
and malicious injury on at least two separate occasions, one of which gave
that court an opportunity to re-examine what some might have consid-
ered an overly narrow reading of the statute. In In re Walker,33 the State
of Texas sued a university professor in state court, alleging that he had
improperly retained professional fees in violation of his contract with the
University of Texas. The court addressed other issues, including a claim
of qualified immunity by the debtor and 11th Amendment issues arising
from the state's status as a party. Regarding dischargeability, however,
the court noted that even in light of Kawaauhau there remained the pos-
sibility that in a combination contract and tort claim, a fact issue remains
whether the actor committed an act resulting in a "willful and malicious
injury. ' 34 Essentially, the court concluded that the trial court should de-
termine whether the professor was aware of his obligations to the univer-
sity regarding professional fees. Presumably, if the professor was aware
and nevertheless knowingly retained those fees with the intent of depriv-
ing the university of fee income to which it actually was entitled, it would
be possible that such a claim would be nondischargeable. 35
28. Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney), 97 F.3d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1996).
29. See id. at 802. Again, the statute describes a willful or malicious injury, although
Congress does not describe how an inanimate injury can be either willful or malicious.
30. For example, the Court previously held that in cases of actual fraud, the creditor
need only establish "justifiable reliance" to support a section 523(a)(2)(A) claim as op-
posed to the more stringent "reasonable reliance" standard specified in section
523(a)(2)(B). See Field v. Mans, 116 U.S. 437 (1995). See generally Roger S. Cox, Bank-
ruptcy and Creditors' Rights 50 SMU L. REV. 989, 900-02 (1995).
31. 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
32. See id. at 217. The court concluded:
In short, the text of § 523(a)(2)(A), the meaning of parallel provisions in the
statute, the historical pedigree of the fraud exception, and the general policy
underlying the exceptions to discharge all support our conclusion that "any
debt ... for money, property, services, or ... credit, to the extent obtained
by" fraud encompasses any liability arising form money, property, etc., that is
fraudently obtained, including treble damages, attorney's fees, and other re-
lief that may exceed the value obtained by the debtor.
Id.
33. Board of Regents v. Walker (In re Walker), 142 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 1998).
34. See id. at 823-24. The court cited McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916), an
intentional conversion case that essentially was reaffirmed in Kawaauhau.
35. See Walker, 142 F.3d at 824.
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Shortly thereafter, in In re Miller,36 the court addressed whether a
claim based upon alleged misappropriation of proprietary information
and misuse of trade secrets was nondischargeable. The Fifth Circuit re-
versed the lower court judgment to the effect that the claim was nondis-
chargeable based upon the state court judgment, primarily because the
Fifth Circuit found that the issue of the debtor's intent was not litigated in
the state court case.37 The court found that the jury's finding that the
debtor acted "wrongfully" in misappropriating funds did not include a
finding of fraudulent intent as necessary to find a debt nondischargeable
for fraud in a fiduciary capacity. 38
The court took the same approach regarding willful and malicious in-
jury. More importantly, however, the court took the opportunity to ana-
lyze willful and malicious injuries in light of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Kawaauhau.39 The Fifth Circuit adopted the concept of "implied mal-
ice" for determining whether a claim results from a "willful and malicious
injury" for dischargeability purposes.40 The court specifically held that an
injury is willful and malicious "where there is either an objective substan-
tial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm. '41 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the Kawaauhau opinion does not foreclose, and
"even encourages," the implied malice approach. 42 In concluding that
the state court did not preclude litigation of the intent issue, the court
held that if the debtor's actions "were at least substantially certain to re-
sult in injury to [another], then the debt is nondischargeable under sec-
tion 523(a)(6). ''43
Obviously, this may be a more common sense approach to what is ad-
mittedly a poorly worded statute. That said, however, it is impossible to
tell whether the Fifth Circuit overstepped the narrow bounds of
Kawaauhau.
E. AUTOMATIC STAY
1. What to Do with the Repossessed Car
What does a secured creditor do when, after repossessing a car but
prior to disposition, the debtor files bankruptcy? Chief Judge Robert Mc-
Guire of the Northern District provides some guidance in In re Zaber.44
In Zaber, the debtor filed an emergency motion to hold the secured credi-
tor (GMAC) in violation of the automatic stay and also for turnover of
36. Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied
Miller v. J.D. Abrams, 119 S. Ct. 1249 (1999); J.D. Abrams v. Miller, 119 S. Ct. 1250 (1999).
37. See id. at 603. Apparently, there were confusing or inconsistent findings by the
state court jury. See id. at 601-02.
38. See id. at 602-03. See also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1998).
39. See In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 603-04.




44. 223 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
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property of the estate. GMAC repossessed the debtor's car on April 12,
and on April 15, the debtor filed Chapter 13, notifying GMAC and fur-
nishing it with proof of insurance effective March 1 and continuing
through September of that year. There was no evidence that GMAC had
any other concerns regarding the debtor's potential flight, concealment of
the automobile, or insurance coverage.
GMAC refused to return the car without payment of its pre-petition
claim for repossession fees, which the debtor agreed to pay at $100 per
month. The parties apparently continued in negotiations for a number of
days; however, although GMAC indicated a willingness to "work out an
agreed order," GMAC never relinquished possession of the vehicle. 45
Negotiations broke down, and an emergency hearing was set. GMAC,
however, still refused to return the vehicle to the debtor.
The court noted a split of opinion on this issue 46 and recognized the
secured creditor's continuing right to adequate protection.47 The court
concluded that although GMAC was permitted a reasonable time to re-
spond, the automatic stay was violated at the time that negotiations be-
tween the debtor and creditor broke down. The court awarded actual
damages and reasonable attorney's fees. The court did not, however, im-
pose punitive damages.48
Zaber is imperative reading for the secured creditor and creditor's
counsel who find themselves in this awkward position. While Zaber does
not provide a precise answer to every situation, the cautious creditor's
counsel should generally advise the creditor to return the vehicle unless
there is a specific reason why the creditor's adequate protection would be
unreasonably compromised. When in doubt, creditor's counsel should
also take every effort to bring the matter to the court's attention as soon
as possible on an emergency basis.49
F. SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE
One issue that rose to the fore in the area of consumer Chapter 7 cases
is the concept of substantial abuse, the statutory authority for which is
45. Id. at 104.
46. See id. at 104. The court emphasized that in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198 (1983), the creditor sought relief from the automatic stay before the debtor
moved for turnover relief. In Zaber, the creditor was perceived to have assumed that the
stay did not apply or that it would determine its own adequate protection. See Zaber, 223
B.R. at 105.
47. See Zaber, 223 B.R. at 104. "There is no argument, however, of the right of the
creditor to protection. The question here is who has the duty to seek that protection." Id.
at 104 (quoting GMAC v. Ryan, 183 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995)).
48. See id. at 107.
49. If the creditor cannot articulate why it is an emergency situation, then there is
probably no compelling reason for refusing to relinquish the car. A good example is pro-
vided by In re Crowe, 160 B.R. 299 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), which involved a purely
possessory mechanic's lien that would have lapsed upon relinquishment of possession. In
that situation, the Bankruptcy Court refused to compel turnover of the vehicle. See id. at
301.
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apparently found at section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 50 Essen-
tially, section 707(b) provides that a case can be dismissed for "substan-
tial abuse" upon a motion by the court or by the United States Trustee. 51
The statute is silent, however, with respect to what constitutes substantial
abuse.52
Judge John C. Akard of the Northern District was the first Texas bank-
ruptcy judge to weigh in on this issue in the case of In re Heasley.53 In
Heasley, the court adopted a modified totality of the circumstances test in
order to determine whether a Chapter 7 case should be discharged for
substantial abuse.54 This test apparently originated in In re Krohn, a
Sixth Circuit opinion.55 According to the test, a court is to ascertain from
the "totality of the circumstances whether [a debtor] is merely seeking an
advantage over his creditors, or instead is [an] 'honest"' debtor and enti-
tled to a discharge.56 The court continued that the "debtor's good faith
and candor in filing schedules and other documents, whether he has en-
gaged in 'eve of bankruptcy purchases,' and whether he was forced into
Chapter 7 by unforeseen or catastrophic events" should also be
considered.57
Most notably, the approach taken in Heasley includes consideration of
debtor's "ability to repay his debts out of future earnings. ' 58 According
to the Sixth Circuit, and apparently Judge Akard, "[t]hat factor alone
may be sufficient to warrant dismissal," even though such "means test-
ing" is excluded from the Bankruptcy Code.59 To Judge Akard's credit,
the court analyzed the (somewhat unusual) facts in Heasley under the
more specific standards enumerated by the Fourth Circuit in In re
Green.60 The factors analyzed by Judge Akard are as follows:
first ... whether the [bankruptcy] petition was filed because of sud-
den illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment ...second ...
whether the debtor incurred cash advances and made consumer
purchases far in excess of his ability to repay ... third ... whether
the debtor's proposed family budget is excessive or unreasonable...
forth . . . whether the debtor's schedules and statement of current
income and expenses reasonably and accurately reflect his true fi-
nancial condition.., fifth.., whether the petition was filed in good
faith ... sixth.. .the relation of a debtor's future income to future ...
expenses. 61
50. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1998).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. 217 BR. 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
54. See id. at 87.




59. Id. (citing In re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127).
60. See id. at 86 (citing Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir.
1991)).
61. Id. at 87-88.
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Also to Judge Akard's credit, the facts in Heasley were somewhat egre-
gious, the debtors' schedules were repeatedly and inexplicably amended
time and again, and the debtors attempted to use Chapter 7 to prefer one
group of unsecured creditors over another. In other words, the debtors'
conduct certainly warranted dismissal for substantial abuse. Despite this
author's concern about a premature jump start on "means testing" (see
below), Heasley was not quite a "means test" case in the sheep's clothing
of "substantial abuse."
Two later cases, however, were to the contrary. In In re Lampkin,62
Judge Frank Monroe of the Western District dismissed a case for substan-
tial abuse based primarily on the debtors' ability to pay a dividend of
nearly forty percent to their unsecured creditors in a hypothetical three-
year Chapter 13 plan. Admittedly, it is somewhat overly simplistic to say
that Lampkin was simply a "means test" case, but the bottom line is that
the debtors in Lampkin were given a period of time within which to con-
vert to Chapter 13 or else have their case be dismissed based primarily
upon their ability to repay debts. 63 Similarly, Chief Judge McGuire of the
Northern District, in In re Laman,64 dismissed a Chapter 7 case based
primarily upon a similar "means test" approach.65
This author certainly agrees that a number of consumer bankruptcy fil-
ings are abusive or perhaps otherwise stretching the Bankruptcy Code to
its limits and that the Heasley case is a good example. However, if Con-
gress intended for "means testing" to be a predicate to relief under Chap-
ter 7, Congress could have so provided. In fact, much of the 1998
legislative-session debate centered around that very issue.66 As Judge
Akard noted in Heasley, Congress failed to define what was meant by
"substantial abuse." But nevertheless, some bankruptcy courts have al-
ready imposed means testing as a condition to Chapter 7 relief. It re-
mains to be seen how the Fifth Circuit, which fashions itself as a "plain
meaning" court, would view this broad reading of the statute.
G. DISMISSAL-SERIAL FILINGS, ETC.
A number of Texas bankruptcy courts during the Survey period ad-
dressed the problem of serial filings, specifically in Chapter 13 cases.
First, in In re Rowe,67 the district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's dis-
missal of a Chapter 13 filing that had been the fifth successive Chapter 13
petition filed by a debtor in an apparent effort to stave off foreclosure on
the debtor's home. Significantly, the debtor filed the last Chapter 13 peti-
62. 221 B.R. 390, 394 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
63. See id. at 392-94.
64. 221 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
65. See id. at 381-86. The court also noted that the debtors enjoyed a fairly sizable
retirement account.
66. See, e.g., David E. Leta, Do the Ends Justify the Means Test?, NAT'l L.., Sept. 28,
1998, at B5; Evelyn H. Biery et al., Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation Hurts Middle Class
Most, TEX. LAw., Aug. 10, 1998, at 26.
67. 220 B.R. 591, 594-95 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997).
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tion at 4:00 p.m., on the day before a scheduled foreclosure sale. There
was some conflicting testimony in the record regarding notice of the
bankruptcy, but the foreclosure sale occurred. The bankruptcy court re-
fused to void the foreclosure sale, noting that in the Fifth Circuit, actions
taken in violation of the automatic stay are voidable and not void.68
Shortly thereafter, Judge Clark of the Southern District dismissed a
Chapter 13 case based on the debtor's unreasonable delay in providing
the court with accurate and complete schedules.69 In In re Nassar, the
bankruptcy court dismissed the bankruptcy petition because a totality of
the circumstances indicated that the petition was filed in bad faith.70 The
Nassar court found that the debtor failed to provide accurate schedules
and failed to make other disclosures, which was especially troublesome
given the debtor's apparent ability to manipulate the amount of compen-
sation available from his closely held corporation. Accordingly, the court
dismissed his case with prejudice against refiling for 180 days. 71
In the Northern District, Judge Akard addressed dismissal of serial
Chapter 13 filings in at least two published opinions. First, in In re Mar-
tin,72 the court dismissed the debtors' third filing with prejudice against
refiling for 180 days. Apparently, the schedules were inadequate and po-
tentially misleading, compounding the problem faced by the court.
A few months later, however, Judge Akard expressed frustration at the
inaction of creditors affected by what had been at least the sixth consecu-
tive filing by the debtor in In re Tuckey.73 The court traced the proce-
dural history of all six filings, culminating in the court's issuance of one
last show cause order. The notice specifically invited all creditors to ap-
pear and present evidence of damages incurred as a result of the debtor's
violation of a prior court order. The debtor did not bother to appear;
more importantly, however, neither did any creditors. The court stated,
in more than twelve years as a United States Bankruptcy Judge, this
court cannot recall one instance of a creditor objecting to a repeat
filing by a debtor.... The only conclusion the court can draw is that
creditors are not concerned about repeat filings. If creditors are not
concerned about repeat filings, should the court be concerned about
them? I think not.74
The court declined to impose sanctions against the debtor.75
68. See id. at 595 (citing In re Jones, 63 F.3d 411, 412 (5th Cir. 1995)).
69. In re Nassar, 216 B.R. 606 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1998).
70. See id. at 608. The court focused on the following factors: "(1) whether the debtor
has stated his debts and expenses accurately; (2) whether he has made any fraudulent rep-
resentation to mislead the bankruptcy court; and (3) whether he has unfairly manipulated
the bankruptcy code." Id.
71. See id.
72. 215 B.R. 119, 121 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
73. 222 B.R. 549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
74. Id. at 552.
75. See id. The opinion does not indicate the ultimate procedural disposition of the
case. But the court did indicate that it would be less proactive in seeking out serial filings
given the creditors' apparent lack of interest. See id.
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In conclusion, courts have understandably grown impatient with serial
filings, especially those designed to thwart the legitimate remedies of se-
cured creditors or when a debtor otherwise flaunts the disclosure and fil-
ing requirements under the Bankruptcy Code. That said, bankruptcy
courts will only go so far to protect the rights of creditors that take no
action to protect themselves.
H. CHAPTER 13 CONFIRMATION
Speaking of good faith in a Chapter 13 context, Judge Lief Clark pro-
vides in In re McLaughlin76 an analysis of the good faith required in con-
nection with confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. The debtors filed a
Chapter 13 plan that proposed to pay the holder of a judgment based on
a breach of fiduciary duty less than two percent on her claim while pro-
viding substantial payments to other creditors. The court found that the
plan was not proposed in good faith 77 and that the plan did not meet the
best interest of creditors test (in other words, whether the creditors would
realize more than in a Chapter 7 liquidation).78
McLaughlin is included in this Survey not so much for its result but
because of its good faith analysis. Fundamentally, the court notes that
the requirement that a plan be proposed in good faith is separate and
distinct from the best interest of creditors test.79 According to Judge
Clark, some courts seem to "conflate" those two tests, "effectively hold-
ing the best interests test to be determinative of the good faith issue." 80
Having separated the two issues, the court then provides an extensive
analysis of the good faith requirement of plan confirmation. Noting is-
sues addressed by other courts,81 the court acknowledged the delicate
balance of having to be "mindful of the fresh start purposes of the Code"
while at the same time being "wary of attempts by debtors to abuse the
Code's remedies. '8 2 In addressing the totality of the circumstances be-
hind the plans proposed in McLaughlin, the court focused on three fac-
tors: "the debtor's pre-petition conduct leading to the [pre-petition state
court] judgment, the timing of the debtor's petition in relation to that
judgment (and the timing of their failure to appeal that judgment), and
the extremely unfavorable treatment that the objecting creditor receives
76. 217 B.R. 772 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
77. See id. at 775-78.
78. See id. at 778-82.
79. See id. at 775.
80. Id. "This mixing of the two issues is needlessly confusing and serves no apparent
purpose. We conclude that the § 1325(a)(3) good faith requirement must be met sepa-
rately from any consideration of the liquidation analysis required by § 1325(a)(4)." Id.
81. The litany of relevant circumstances found in the case law includes but is
not limited to the debtor's earning potential and past employment history,
the duration of the plan, the accuracy of information provided by the debtor,
whether the plan is preferential to certain creditors, whether the debt in-
volved would be dischargeable in Chapter 7, prior bankruptcy filings by the
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under the terms of the proposed plan."'83 The court concluded that, while
it did not wish to "penalize" the debtors for the presence of any one of
those factors, the "synergistic effect of these factors leads us to the con-
clusion that these plans have not been proposed in good faith."'84
I. ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEBTOR'S COUNSEL
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of attorney's fees for debtor's
counsel in an opinion issued after the Survey period. Given its potential
impact on existing cases, however, it is included in this Survey. For rea-
sons described below, its ultimate significance has yet to be seen. In In re
Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc.,85 the Fifth Circuit held that Chapter 11
debtor's counsel is not entitled to compensation from the estate for serv-
ices rendered after the appointment of a trustee. The court based its de-
cision on the plain meaning of section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
governs compensation to professionals. Crucially, the court noted that in
the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress removed the
words "the debtor's attorney" from that section's list of persons who
could be compensated from the bankruptcy estate.8 6 Although the court
struggled with what some might classify as an inequitable result, 87 the
court nevertheless concluded that the statute was clear and unambiguous
on its face and that it specifically excluded the debtor's attorney.8 8 "[I]n
the absence of any ambiguity, our examination is confined to the words of
the statute, which are assumed to carry their ordinary meaning." 89 When
a debtor ceases to be a "debtor in possession," effectively serving in lieu
of a trustee, there is no longer a statutory basis for awarding fees to coun-
sel for a debtor.
Of perhaps even more importance to the typical Chapter 11 case (if
there is such a thing) is language found later in the opinion when the Fifth
Circuit analyzes the pre-trustee fees of the debtor's counsel. Debtor's
counsel argued that a "reasonableness test," inquiring whether the serv-
ices were "objectively beneficial toward the completion of the case at the
time they were performed," should be the appropriate test.90 The ob-
83. Id. at 778.
84. Id.
85. Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P. v. Family Snack, Inc. (In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 157
F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 1998).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1998); Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 422.
87. "We decide the issue before us bound by our conventions of statutory construc-
tion, even though common sense might lead the lay observer to conclude that a different
result is perhaps more appropriate. The law, and the rules to which we adhere in order to
interpret it, does not always conform to the dictates of common sense." Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d
at 424-25.
88. "In this case, we are faced with a statute which is clear on its face. It excludes
attorneys from its catalog of professional officers of a bankruptcy estate who may be com-
pensated for their work after the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee." Id. at 425.
89. Id. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 566 (1994) ("As long as
the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to
inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.").
90. Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 426.
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jecting creditors (who also happened to be the petitioning creditors in the
initial involuntary filing) urged a more stringent test of "whether
[debtor's counsel] services resulted in an identifiable, tangible, and mate-
rial benefit to the bankruptcy estate."91 The Fifth Circuit chose the latter,
more stringent test. While it is hard to argue against the court's conclu-
sion that "any work performed by legal counsel on behalf of a debtor
must be of material benefit to the estate, '92 what is of more concern is
the court's approval of the District Court's instruction to "consider
strongly the debtor's lack of success in obtaining confirmation of the
Chapter 11 plan."' 93 In other words, "the chances of success must out-
weigh the costs of pursuing the action.' 94 Even though the bankruptcy
court found support for the debtor's plan among other creditors, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that debtor's counsel "should have known from the
outset that the [d]ebtor's prosecution of a Chapter 11 plan would fail,'9 5
and, therefore, fees should not be allowed.
A cynical reading of Pro-Snax indicates that the Fifth Circuit suggests
that debtor's counsel, gazing into its crystal ball, should be able to predict,
prior to taking a Chapter 11 case, whether the case would have some
likelihood of success. This could have a chilling effect on distressed busi-
nesses being able to locate counsel, because in many cases debtors come
to Chapter 11 with an inherently unconfirmable plan in the absence of
creditor cooperation. Many Chapter 11 cases define success by other
than a confirmed plan, and other cases are dismissed or converted with
the cooperation and agreement of all parties. Does Pro-Snax suggest that
fees for debtor's counsel are inherently unavailable in such cases or that
counsel will be subjected to a 20-20 hindsight test? Only time will tell.
J. COLLATERAL VALUATION
Most regular readers of this Survey are familiar with the saga of In re
Rash.96 The Supreme Court in Rash held that for purposes of confirming
a debt adjustment plan in which a debtor proposes to retain and use col-
lateral, a replacement cost should be used. 97 Although the Supreme
Court ended a long and tortured history of that case, courts are still left to
address collateral valuation issues.
In In re Davis,98 Judge Felsenthal of the Northern District addressed






96. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
97. See id. at 1886.
98. 215 B.R. 824 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
99. Prior to the Survey, Judge Felsenthal also addressed collateral valuation in In re
Jenkins, 215 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997), in which the court went through a thorough
analysis of valuing a vehicle in a motion to lift stay/adequate protection setting in light of
the Supreme Court's instructions in Rash.
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ing of valuation, specifically "whether, for [Chapter 13] confirmation pur-
poses, the value of a vehicle should be determined as of date filing the
bankruptcy petition or the date of confirmation." 100 As a fundamental
proposition, the court concluded that the vehicle should be valued as of
the plan confirmation date, which is the effective date as of which a se-
cured creditor must receive property of the value of its secured claim. 10
The secured creditor argued that the petition date was the more appropri-
ate valuation date; however, the court concluded that the creditor had
been adequately protected by pre-confirmation disbursements that ex-
ceeded the depreciation between the petition date and the confirmation
date.102
In effect, the Davis court concluded that a vehicle securing a claim may
be valued as of the petition date to determine adequate protection pay-
ments, which should protect the secured creditor until confirmation. For
confirmation purposes, however, the court concluded that the confirma-
tion date was more appropriate. 10 3 Assuming Judge Felsenthal's analysis
is correct, this again illustrates the need for the secured creditor to take
appropriate steps to make sure that its interest is adequately protected
pending confirmation. Unfortunately, in districts where pre-confirmation
disbursements are prohibited, such a practical approach may prove prob-
lematic, theoretically leaving the secured creditor only the remedy of
seeking relief from the automatic stay if its interest cannot be adequately
protected.
K. REAFFIRMATION AND OTHER POST-PETITION AcTIONS
Three opinions from Judge Akard of the Northern District are illustra-
tive of the trouble that a creditor or its representative can get into by
careless or even overreaching steps taken post-petition. In In re Smith,10 4
an entity apparently acting as a collection agent for a retailer sent what
appeared to be a fairly standard inquiry regarding redemption, reaffirma-
tion, or surrender of property securing a consumer debt. This collection
service, however, failed to provide debtor's counsel with evidence of the
creation or perfection of a security interest, but rather simply demanded
that the debtor exercise one of the three options10 5 After being
presented with the letter, the court entered an order denying reaffirma-
tion and issuing injunctions in which the court denied the reaffirmation,
found the claim to be unsecured, and enjoined the creditor from taking
any post-petition collection actions. The creditor representative filed a
100. Davis, 215 B.R. at 825.
101. See id.
102. "The adequate protection payments protect GMAC's interest in the vehicle from
petition date to confirmation date." Id. at 826.
103. See id.
104. 223 B.R. 108 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
105. See id. at 109. "The letter did not contain an description [sic] of the collateral nor
any indication of its value. No evidence of the asserted purchase money security interest
was attached to the letter." Id.
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motion for new trial; however, once again, the underlying documentation
was lacking. The court denied the motion, stating that it was simply ask-
ing for nothing more than a creditor would otherwise been required to
attach to its proof of claim. 1 6
In In re Allen,1" 7 the debtors presented for approval a reaffirmation
agreement with their mortgage company, that included bankruptcy attor-
ney's fees of $125.108 The court found that reaffirmation agreements are
governed by section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which contains no
separate provision regarding the imposition of attorney's fees by a credi-
tor who happens to be a party to a reaffirmation agreement. The court,
finding that no other request for approval of attorney's fees had been
filed, held that the creditor should be enjoined from collecting any such
fees. 109
Faced with what can only be described as a bizarre set of facts arising
over a series of cases, Judge Akard took some serious steps with respect
to lawyers who had engaged in a pattern of filing objections to dis-
chargeability of credit card debt without serving debtors or debtor's
counsel. In In re Dragoo,t" 0 the court noted that typically debtors
learned of objections only when matters arose on the trial docket. 1'
When the cases were called for trial, no one would appear on behalf of
the creditor, and the court typically awarded sanctions. The court subse-
quently became aware that one law firm had filed all or substantially all
of those cases. The court traced the procedural history of three different
Chapter 7 cases and discussed the efforts of various creditors represented
by these lawyers to compromise and settle claims arising out of those
activities. The court refrained from imposing monetary sanctions on the
lawyers, given a series of personal problems that had beset them during
the time in question. The court did, however, suspend the lawyers from
practice in the Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern District of Texas for a
four year period." 2
The lesson for the consumer lender from this trilogy of cases is quite
simple: when asserting a claim, submit the documentation giving rise to
your claim, and when seeking to deprive a debtor of the fresh start to
which he or she is entitled, do so only when: (a) there are suitable
grounds for doing so, and (b) with full and adequate notice to the debtor
106. See id. at 110. "Nothing less should be required in connection with a creditor's
request for a reaffirmation agreement, surrender, or redemption." Id.
107. 215 B.R. 503 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
108. See id. at 504.
109. See id. at 505. The court also required the creditor to file an affidavit by an execu-
tive officer of the creditor certifying that attorney's fees had not and would not be charged
against the debtors, their escrow account, or their note. The court also noted that "prepa-
ration of a claim is a ministerial act for which no attorney's fees should be charged against
a debtor." Id. at 504.
110. 219 B.R. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
111. See id. at 461.
112. See id. at 467.
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and debtor's counsel. These rules seem obvious, but they remain
honored in the breach.
L. RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF PLAN CONFIRMATION
Although the author intended to avoid discussions of the technical as-
pects of plan confirmation, one case bears mentioning that might other-
wise be overlooked because it arose in the state courts. In Geary v. Texas
Commerce Bank,113 the Texas Supreme Court held that the executor of
the estate of a deceased person who was originally liable as a guarantor of
an obligation of a Chapter 11 debtor corporation was entitled to assert
the res judicata effect of a Chapter 11 plan confirmation order. Relying
initially on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf,114
the court determined that, as a fundamental concept, it is possible for a
guarantor to enjoy res judicata protection; but, according to the Texas
Supreme Court, the Shoaf court did not address the issue of whether the
parties were identical in both suits in order for res judicata to apply. 115
The court concluded, however, that identity of parties existed. The court
determined that the corporation's plan of reorganization addressed the
interests of the guarantor by purporting to release the guarantor's joint
debt and concluded that the guarantor "was therefore a party to the
bankruptcy and can assert res judicata because the bankruptcy proceeding
affected his liabilities as executor. ' 116
The Fifth Circuit, however, also addressed the issue of res judicata in a
plan confirmation context in In re Taylor.1' 7 Taylor is not analyzed in this
Survey, but the court distinguished the case (involving a determination of
a tax claim) from Shoaf. The court declined to assign res judicata effect to
confirmation of a plan that purported to discharge a tax debt without
invoking what the court perceived was the normal process for determina-
tion of tax claims.' 18
III. OTHER CREDITOR'S RIGHTS CASES
What follows are several randomly selected cases of interest that pro-
vide insight into the enforcement (or defense) of the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. The Survey does not include every case but rather a selection of
cases to provide insight and reminders to the prudent practitioner. 1 9
113. 967 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1998).
114. 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987) (entitling plan confirmation order releasing debtor's
guarantor to res judicata effect).
115. See id. at 838.
116. Id. at 839.
117. Internal Revenue Service v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 132 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998).
118. See id. at 262-63.
119. For an inclusive survey of cases that bear not only on enforcement of the debtor-
creditor relationship but also on documentation and creation of that relationship, see
David A. Weatherbie, Recent Case Update, University of Texas Mortgage Lending Institute
(1998). Similar presentations are provided by Mr. Weatherbie for the State Bar of Texas
Advanced Real Estate Law Course. See David A. Weatherbie, Recent Case Update, State
Bar of Texas Advanced Real Estate Law Course (1998).
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A. LIMITATIONS-ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT
In a case originally arising as a bankruptcy case, the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed statutes of limitations under state law-specifically, whether and
to what extent a writing can serve as an acknowledgment of a debt suffi-
cient to toll or renew limitations under Texas law. In In re Vineyard Bay
Development Co.,12" the debtor objected to a proof of claim that had
been filed by a secured creditor based upon what amounted to a state law
statute of limitations defense. The creditor asserted that debtor's counsel
had written two letters that effectively acknowledged the debt under state
law. In one or both letters, however, counsel had apparently stated that
limitations had expired and reiterated that the statements contained in
the letter were not to be considered an admission. In the second letter,
counsel made more affirmative statements that might have constituted an
acknowledgment of the debt under state law; however, the second letter
was written after the bankruptcy filing.
In effect, an acknowledgment of a debt under state law operates as a
new obligation and not a mere revival of the prior debt.121 Whether an
acknowledgment of a debt contains the unequivocal statements necessary
to defeat limitations under state law is a question of law. 122
Apparently, the first letter did not rise to the level of an acknowledg-
ment of the debt, especially given the reservation against intending any
admission in the letter.123 The court invoked bankruptcy law, however,
to invalidate the second letter. It reasoned that an acknowledgment of a
debt is in effect a new obligation, and the new obligation would have
required bankruptcy court's approval because it was made post-peti-
tion.124 Finally, the court declined to apply estoppel based upon oral rep-
resentations, given the writing requirement under the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code.' 25
B. LIMITATIONS-REAL ESTATE LIEN DEBT
Cadle Co. v. Butler126 addressed the requirements for renewing and
extending limitations on real estate lien debt, which is governed by sec-
tions 16.036 and 16.037 of the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES
120. Kearns v. Vineyard Bay Dev. Co. (In re Vineyard Bay Dev. Co.), 132 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1998).
121. See id. at 271 (citing Allied Chem. Corp. v. Koonce, 548 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, n.w.h.)).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 272.
125. See id. Again, Vineyard Bay addressed Texas law. Under federal law, the thresh-
old for acknowledgment of a debt appears to be less stringent. See Midstates Resources
Corp. v. Farmer's Aerial Spraying Serv., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(Settlement letter sent by debtor's counsel constituted acknowledgment of debt under fed-
eral statutes, which applied to FDIC's assignee.). See also United States v. J.R. LaPointe
& Sons, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Maine 1996) (Borrower's application for settlement of
FMHA debt constituted acknowledgment of debt under Federal statute of limitations.).
126. 951 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
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CODE. 127 In Butler, the maturity date of a real estate lien debt was not
reflected on the deed of trust. The note matured in 1988, with a number
of oral extensions. No written extension was signed until October 1993.
Meanwhile, in March 1993, Cadle abstracted a judgment against the
maker of the note. Cadle's judgment lien prevailed over the deed of trust
lien because of the lack of a recorded, properly executed extension agree-
ment.128 According to statute, the maturity date stated in the original
instrument is conclusive evidence of the maturity date of the debt.129
Even if the parties had been able to look to the underlying loan docu-
ment given the missing maturity date in the deed of trust, oral extensions
would not have been binding on the bona fide purchaser. Accordingly,
the intervening judgment lien prevailed. 130
C. CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION CLAUSES
Another bankruptcy case decided during the Survey period may have
state law implications. In In re Conte,131 Judge Sharp of the Eastern Dis-
trict addressed a cross-collateralization clause under which a credit union/
credit card issuer refused to release the title to a motor vehicle after pay-
ment of a car loan so long as the same issuer held an unpaid debt on an
outstanding credit card balance. The credit union asserted that a cross-
collateralization clause in the automobile loan documents provided the
creditor a security interest securing the payment of the credit card debt.
Judge Sharp recognized well established law upholding the validity of
cross-collateralization clauses,t 32 and he also recognized statutory author-
ity for future advances in similar security. 133 The court, however, deter-
mined that cross-collateralization clauses "apply only to indebtedness
which was reasonably within the contemplation of the parties to the se-
curity instrument at the time it was made."' 34 Even though Judge Sharp
declined to consider parol evidence (which was to the effect that the debt-
ors did not intend for the credit card debt to be secured by the vehicle),
the court determined that securing the credit card debt by the car was not
contemplated by the parties 135 and held that the credit union no longer
held a valid lien against the debtor's vehicle upon payment of the initial
127. The statute provides the express requirements for renewal and extension of real
estate lien debt, at least as to protect against claims of bona fide purchasers. Essentially,
the renewal must be executed by the debtor, acknowledged, and recorded. See TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.036-.037 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
128. See Cadle Co., 951 S.W.2d at 913.
129. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.036(D) (VERNON SUPP. 1998).
130. See Cadle Co., 951 S.W.2d at 913.
131. 217 B.R. 767 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1998).
132. See id. at 769.
133. See id. (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(c) (Vernon 1991)).
134. Id.
135. For example, the truth in lending disclosure did not indicate that the car loan
would also secure future advances, and the court was also concerned about the location of
the cross-collateralization clause on one of the documents, being placed on the reverse side




Superficially, it might be tempting to say that Judge Sharp purported to
invalidate cross-collateralization or future advances clauses; however, a
careful reading of the opinion reflects the contrary. The court expressly
recognized the validity of such clauses. But from a drafting standpoint, it
might be wise to include such clauses on the face of any loan documenta-
tion, especially in a consumer loan, or otherwise provide some conspicu-
ousness or other indication from the face of the documents that such
cross-collateralization or future advance coverage was intended.
Whether these extra steps are actually required under state law is ques-
tionable, but Conte clearly indicates that, at a minimum, such clauses will
be given close scrutiny in consumer bankruptcy cases.
D. LOST NOTES, MISSING INDICIES, ETC.
Some remnants of the days of failed banks remain. At least three cases
published during the Survey period are instructive. In Beal Bank v.
Caddo Parish-Villas South, Ltd.,137 a federal district court, reviewing an
appeal from a bankruptcy claim objection, addressed recovery on a lost
note following assignment of the lost note. Although Beal Bank involved
Louisiana law, the statute in question was substantially similar to section
3.309 of the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which governs enforcement of lost instruments. 38 One additional twist,
which was not uncommon during the time of large note sales by the
FDIC, was that Beal Bank took the assignment of the note after the note
had been misplaced by its assignor. In other words, Beal Bank had taken
a transfer or assignment of a lost note. The district court found that Beal
Bank complied with section 3-309(a) and that Beal Bank proved the
terms of the lost instrument. 139 The district court concluded that Beal
Bank was entitled to enforce the note, even as the assignee of the party
that had already lost the note. 1411 One would assume that the result
would be the same under Texas law. Texas law generally allows assign-
ment of claims and causes of action, which should include the right to
recover on a lost note provided the other statutory and common law re-
quirements can be met by the new owner of the note.
Speaking of assignment, the Dallas Court of Appeals in Ashcraft v.
136. See id. at 771-72.
137. 218 B.R. 851 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
138. This case involves application of Louisiana's version of U.C.C. Section 3.309(a).
The Louisiana statute, like section 3.309 of the TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE,
allows a person to recover on a lost instrument if: (1) the person was in possession of the
instrument when lost; (2) the loss was not the result of transfer or a lawful seizure; and (3)
the person cannot reasonable retain possession of the instrument because it was destroyed,
lost, etc. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
139. See Beal Bank, 218 B.R. at 855.
140. "There is absolutely nothing in the text of the statute or the legislative history to
indicate that a party entitled to enforce a lost instrument under Section 3-309(a) cannot
assign this right to another party." Id. at 856.
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Lookadoo' 4' held that the purchaser of a note deficiency from the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation was not entitled to enforce an underlying guar-
anty obligation of that same indebtedness because the guaranty
obligation was not expressly mentioned in the loan sale agreement. This
case may be an anomaly, and it certainly would appear to contravene the
general rule that the guaranty follows the underlying obligation, at least
superficially. But the court apparently found distinguishing facts in that
case arising out of specific language in the purchase and sale agreement
from the RTC to the note buyer.142 It is not this author's position to
describe an opinion as correct or incorrect. Suffice it to say that the opin-
ion may be an aberration, and the dissent would appear somewhat more
persuasive.143
In Commercial Services of Perry v. Wooldridge,1 the court of appeals
affirmed a take nothing judgment in favor of the maker of a variable in-
terest rate note. The variable rate was tied to the published rate of a
bank that had failed. Thus, the variable rate provided in the note was
tied to a published rate that no longer existed. The court acknowledged
that variable rate notes are clearly considered promises to pay a fixed
amount of money1 45 and also acknowledged that recent case law allowed
the holder of a note tied to a no longer published rate to apply a "reason-
able" rate of interest based upon evidence of such a rate. 146 This, how-
ever, did not excuse the holder of the note from putting on evidence of
what that reasonable rate would be. The court also declined to apply a
statutory rate under section 3.112(b), which the court found applied in
situations only where the instrument is silent as to the calculation of in-
terest.147 Accordingly, the court concluded that because the holder of the
note failed to prove "a reasonable sum certain due and owing on the
note," it should take nothing because it failed to prove its claim as a mat-
ter of law.148
As with some of the other cases described above in which the creditor
was denied recovery, the court did not invalidate recovery in such a situa-
tion. Rather, the court simply insisted upon a relatively low threshold of
evidence, in this case, evidence of what a reasonable or replacement rate
should be. Presumably, this could have been accomplished by expert tes-
timony of a banker, or even evidence of other published rates in effect at
the time.
141. 952 S.W.2d 907, 913-14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied) (per curium).
142. See id. at 911-13.
143. See id. at 917-21 (Wright, J., dissenting).
144. 968 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1998, no pet.).
145. See id. at 564.
146. This issue was resolved in Bailey, Vaught, Robertson & Co. v. Remington Invs.,
Inc., 888 S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
147. See Wooldridge, 968 S.W.2d at 565 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.112(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
148. Id. at 565-66.
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E. NOTE ACCELERATION-THE CHECK'S IN THE MAIL
In Star Food Processing, Inc. v. Killian, Star executed a note containing
a waiver of "notices, demands for payment, presentations for payment,
notices of intention to accelerate the maturity, protest and notice of pro-
test." 149 The waiver did not, however, mention notice of acceleration.
After default, the creditor's counsel faxed a notice of acceleration and
demanded payment in full. According to the borrower, however, the bor-
rower had placed a late payment in the mail two hours before the fax
notice of acceleration. Thereafter, the borrower kept sending regular
payments, but they were returned, because those payments did not con-
stitute payment in full as demanded by the acceleration. Apparently de-
ciding that the "check's in the mail" defense worked, the court concluded
that the acceleration was improper because payment had been made
before the acceleration. 50
The obvious moral of this story is twofold: first, the careful drafter
should make sure that any waiver provision in a note is broad enough to
include (expressly) notice of acceleration. Secondly, and perhaps more
important, if this case is valid, then it may be wise to include a provision
to the effect that payment is only deemed made upon actual receipt by
the holder of the note at the specified place for payment, thus contractu-
ally precluding the "check's in the mail" defense to acceleration.
F. ARTICLE 9 PRIORITY-MISFILED FINANCING STATEMENTS
In Franklin National Bank v. Boser,15' the holder of a purchase money
security interest (PMSI) in cattle sued a bank that had foreclosed a prior,
perfected security interest in the same cattle. Unfortunately for the
holder of the PMSI, he had filed his financing statement in the local
records of the county clerk, rather than with the Secretary of State, which
is the proper place for filing. The PMSI holder attempted, unsuccessfully,
to invoke the "good faith filing exception" contained in section 9.401(b),
which provides some relief for a secured party who, in good faith, files a
financing statement in the improper place, at least as to other persons
with knowledge of that financing statement. 52 The court concluded that
this good faith exception does not apply to a second-in-time creditor as
against a prior, perfected lienholder.153 Accordingly, the bank prevailed,
and the PMSI holder ultimately paid the price for the improper filing.154
G. EXEMPTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
In not so much a significant development, but rather a reiteration of
what should by now be a well established law, a Houston Court of Ap-
149. 954 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
150. See id. at 126.
151. 972 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
152. See id. at 103 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(b) (Vernon 1991)).
153. See id. at 103-04.
154. See id. at 104-06.
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peals, in Lozano v. Lozano,155 reiterated the exempt nature of a properly
established individual retirement account. The court determined that
"evidence that an account is an individual retirement annuity is sufficient
to establish that it is exempt unless evidence is presented that the IRA
does not qualify for such treatment under the [Internal Revenue
Code]." 156
H. NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE SALE
In Sanders v. Shelton,157 the court of appeals found that a notice of a
substitute trustee's sale that stated that the sale would occur "between
the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m." was sufficient to give notice that
the sale would not occur before 10:00 a.m. The notice, therefore, met the
requirements of the Property Code, even including the amendments that
limit the sale to three hours following the earliest time stated in the no-
tice.158 While it would clearly be better practice simply to provide on the
notice the earliest time of the sale, the court found that the notice con-
taining the somewhat outdated language of between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00
p.m. was sufficient to provide notice of the earliest time of the sale.
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the only remaining requirement
is that the sale must begin at the time stated in the notice or not later than
three hours thereafter.1 59
I. GARNISHMENT
Rowley v. Lake Area National Bank 60 provides somewhat of a primer
on the issues in a garnishment action. The Rowley court starts with the
fundamental proposition that a plaintiff in garnishment "merely steps into
the shoes of his debtor as against the garnishee."'' 61 In Rowley, the credi-
tor sought to garnish a bank that held funds to be disbursed to a builder
to whom the builder's customer was indebted. The bank, however, had
no deposit or debtor-creditor relationship with that builder. Therefore,
because the bank was not indebted to the builder/judgment debtor, there
were no funds subject to garnishment.
Another important issue which often arises in garnishment action is
that of attorney's fees incurred by the garnishee. In Rowley, the some-
155. 975 S.W.2d 63, 66-68 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th District] 1998, no pet.). Under
Texas law, most qualified retirement accounts, such as the IRA in question in this case, are
exempt from creditor claims. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon 1997).
156. Lozano, 975 S.W.2d at 67. The court concluded that because the statute in ques-
tion provides that such an account is exempt unless it does not qualify under the Internal
Revenue Code, the burden upon the debtor is merely to show only that the plan or account
is of the type listed in the statute. Then, the burden would shift to the creditor to show that
the plan or account is not a qualified plan. See id. at 67 n.4.
157. 970 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
158. See id. at 724-26.
159. See id. at 725-26. The court also disposed of other claims that the alleged irregular-
ity in the sale notice contributed to an inadequate sale price. See id. at 726-27.
160. 976 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st District] 1998, no pet.).
161. Id. at 719.
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what unusual twist was that the garnishment was contested. The court
reversed the trial court in part based upon TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 677, which provides that "where the answer is contested, the costs
shall abide the issue of such contest."1 62 The court of appeals remanded
the case for consideration of the appropriate award of attorney's fees,
reasoning that under prior case law, the term "costs" has "consistently
been interpreted to include attorney's fees." 163
162. Id. at 721 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 677).
163. Id. (citing Moody Nat'l Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th District] 1997, writ denied)).
[Vol. 52
